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In human societies, people’s willingness to compete and strive for better social status as well as
being envious of those perceived in some way superior lead to social structures that are intrinsically
hierarchical. Here we propose an agent-based, network model to mimic the ranking behaviour of
individuals and its possible repercussions in human society. The main ingredient of the model is the
assumption that the relevant feature of social interactions is each individual’s keenness to maximise
his or her status relative to others. The social networks produced by the model are homophilous and
assortative, as frequently observed in human communities and most of the network properties seem
quite independent of its size. However, it is seen that for small number of agents the resulting network
consists of disjoint weakly connected communities while being highly assortative and homophilic.
On the other hand larger networks turn out to be more cohesive with larger communities but less
homophilic. We find that the reason for these changes is that larger network size allows agents to
use new strategies for maximizing their social status allowing for more diverse links between them.
community formation, opinion formation, social hierarchy
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive tendencies of humans is
putting things in ranking order. In human societies these
tendencies are reflected in their social interactions and
networks being hierarchical in many respects. Hierar-
chies and ranks emerge due to individuals’ subjective per-
ceptions that some other individuals are in some respect
better. Then a relevant research question is whether or
not the formation and structure of hierarchies in human
societies can be understood by making the assumption
that the dominant driving force of people in social in-
teractions is to enhance their own “value” or “status”
relative to others. We call this assumption “better than-
hypothesis” (BTH) and note that it is closely related
to the thinking of the school of individual psychology
founded by Adler in the early 1900s [1], which, while
starting with the assumption that human individuals uni-
versally strive for “superiority” over others, emphasizes
inferiority avoidance as a motive for many human actions.
Further studies of this kind of individuals’ status-
seeking behaviour, especially concerning consumer be-
haviour and economics, include the canonical references
by Veblen [2], Duesenberry [3] and Packard [4] (See also
Refs [5–8]). In addition there is a closely related socio-
logical model called Social Dominance Theory [9], which
proposes that the construction and preservation of so-
cial hierarchies is one of the main motivations of humans
in their social interactions and networks. However, the
most relevant observational facts concerning BTH come
from the field of experimental economics, especially from
the results of experiments on the so-called “ultimatum
game” [10], where the human players have been shown
to reject too unequal distributions of money. The con-
cept of inequity aversion, that is the observed social phe-
nomenon of humans preferring equal treatment in their
societies, is often invoked to explain these observations.
Recently some models featuring inequity aversion have
been proposed in Refs. [11, 12].
All of these models, although from different fields of
study, have something to do with the relative standings
between different human individuals and groups, and so
they could all be considered to emerge from or be based
on a single principle such as BTH. It is this generality
which makes BTH an intriguing and interesting object
of study. There are even some studies on economic data,
such as [13], that suggest a link between relative social
standings and human well-being, and considerations of
social status have measurable effects on brain functions,
as shown in e.g. [14, 15]. These studies imply that BTH
could well be something fundamental to human nature.
The competition for a better hierarchical position
among humans can be intense and sometimes even vio-
lent. However, humans have other characteristics includ-
ing egalitarianism as well as striving for fairness. These
traits could be interpreted in the context of BTH by re-
marking that people need to live in societies and make
diverse social bonds, which in turn would contribute to
their social status. This means that the members of soci-
ety when they make decisions, need to take the feelings of
others into account. Hence the behavioral patterns of in-
dividuals in social networks should then be characterised
by sensitivity to the status of the other individuals in
the network. This sensitivity manifests itself as inequity
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2aversion and treating others fairly. To find out what in
this context are the plausible and relevant mechanisms of
human sociality driving societal level community forma-
tion we will focus on improving the BTH-based approach
by using the frame of agent-based models and studying
the emergence of social norms in such social systems, fol-
lowing the tradition presented in Refs. [16–21].
In this study we use an agent-based network model
applying BTH-based approach to simulate social inter-
actions dependent on societal values and rank, to get
insight to their global effects on the structure of soci-
ety. We find that in such a model society with a given
constant ranking system the social network forms a de-
gree hierarchy on top of the ranking system under BTH,
such that the agents’ degrees tend to increase, the further
away their rank is from the average. The structure of the
paper is as follows. In Section II we motivate the basics
of BTH using the simple and well-researched ultimatum
game as an example, and in Section III we show how the
findings from this can be utilised as a part of agent-based
models. In Section IV we present the numerical results
of the simulations from the model, and in Section V we
analyse them. The two final Sections discuss the possible
interpretations of the results and present the conclusions.
II. BETTER THAN-HYPOTHESIS AND
ULTIMATUM GAME
In this section we describe the theoretical basis for our
model. We start by analysing the ultimatum game first
proposed in [10], as it allows us to derive a basic form for
the social gain function in our model. The ultimatum
game is a game with two players, where one player has
the task to make a proposal to the other player about
how a given sum of money should be divided between
them. The second player then gets to choose if the pro-
posal is acceptable or not; if it is, the money is divided
as proposed. If not, neither player gets anything. Exper-
iments show that humans playing this game normally do
not accept deals that are perceived to be unfair, i.e. in
situations in which the proposer gets too large a share
of the money (see, e.g. Refs. [22–27]). This is a classic
problem in the mainstream economics, where humans are
assumed to be rational and, therefore, accept something
rather than nothing.
We implement BTH in the ultimatum game by inter-
preting the money used in a deal as a way of compar-
ing the status between the one who accepts the proposal
(called from now on the accepter) and its proposer. We
denote the change of “status” of the accepter as ∆a,
which takes into account it’s own monetary gain, and the
gain in relation to the proposer. Therefore, the simplest
expression for ∆a is,
∆a =Ra(t1)−Ra(t0) + [Ra(t1)−Rp(t1)]
− [Ra(t0)−Rp(t0)], (1)
where Ra(t) and Rp(t) stand for the monetary reserves
(in the context of the game) of the accepter and proposer,
respectively, at time t, with t0 being the time before the
deal and t1 the time after the deal. In terms of economic
theory, ∆a would be called the accepter’s change of util-
ity, which is ordinarily assumed to consist of the term
Ra(t1) − Ra(t0) or the absolute payoff of the accepter.
The additional terms [Ra(t1)−Rp(t1)]− [Ra(t0)−Rp(t0)]
that stem from the BTH measuring the change in rela-
tive standings of the accepter and proposer. The actual
BTH utility function for the accepter in the ultimatum
game takes the form
UBTHa = Ra + [Ra −Rp]. (2)
According to Eq. (1), the accepter will refuse the deal
for ∆a < 0, and will accept it for ∆a > 0, with ∆a = 0
being the borderline case. Should the deal be rejected,
Ra(t1) = Ra(t0) and Rp(t1) = Rp(t0), and, consequently,
∆a = 0. If we denote by Rmax the total amount of
money to be shared and by Rshare the actual amount
money that the proposer has reserved for the accepter,
then in the case where the transaction does take place
we have Ra(t1) = Ra(t0)+Rshare and Rp(t1) = Rp(t0)+
(Rmax − Rshare). If we further assume that Ra(t0) =
Rp(t0) (i.e. the players start on equal footing, which
may very well be the case in the context of the game at
least), it follows from Eq.(1) that the smallest offer that
the accepter expects from the proposer is one third of the
maximum Rmax, i.e. the condition
Rshare >
Rmax
3
(3)
must hold for the proposal to be acceptable.
Previous literature shows that the minimum offers that
people are usually willing to accept are around 30% of
a given quantity [24], in close agreement with the cal-
culation above. Moreover, we note that if the term
Ra(t1)−Ra(t0) in Eq. (1) is neglected, then the accepter
will never settle for less than half of the total amount.
Next we use Eq. (1) to illustrate how the BTH-based
approach can be implemented in the context of agent
based social simulations. The trick is to generalise this
equation to the cases of many players, and with multiple
and different kinds of items being exchanged. If there
are N players (denoted by i = 1, . . . , N), the change of
status ∆i of the individual i may be written as follows
∆i = Ri(t1)−Ri(t0)
+
∑
j 6=i
[Ri(t1)−Rj(t1)]
−
∑
j 6=i
[Ri(t0)−Rj(t0)]. (4)
In the case that players have several ways to measure
their status, we may introduce normalisation factors to
compare the relative value of the exchanged items, and
3write the change of status as,
∆i =
∑
α
1
Nαi
{
Rαi (t1)−Rαi (t0)
+
∑
j 6=i
[
Rαi (t1)−Rαj (t1)
]
−
∑
j 6=i
[
Rαi (t0)−Rαj (t0)
]}
(5)
where the index α runs over the various items determin-
ing the status, and Nαi is the normalisation factor of each
item, which may vary from one player to another. The
utility function associated with Eq. (5) reads then
UBTHi =
∑
α
1
Nαi
{
Rαi +
∑
j 6=i
[
Rαi −Rαj
]}
. (6)
III. THE BTH AND AGENT-BASED
NETWORK MODEL
In this section we present an agent-based model of a
ranked social system of N agents, in which the agents
exchange their views of the ranking system itself. To
each agent i we assign a parameter ai to describe the
rank of the agent, and a state variable xi to denote the
opinion of the agent i of the social value attached to pa-
rameter a. The social value is then a relative quantity
in the minds of the agents, and they value each other
in either ascending or descending order according to the
“ranking parameter”, we call a, and xi determines which
order a given agent i prefers and how strongly. Generally
speaking, the sign of xi represents the chosen order, −
for descending and + for ascending order, while its mag-
nitude represents the strength of conviction: with |xi|= 0
the agent can be said to support equality of all the agents
irrespective of the ranking parameter, with |xi|= 1 the
agent thinks that a should directly define the hierarchy
of the society, and for the case |xi|< 1 or |xi|> 1 cor-
respondinly downplaying or emphasizing the significance
of a, respectively. Here, we adopt the maximum value
for |xi| to be 1000.
To put the relation of the social value and the opinion
parameter into more precise terms, we adopt the follow-
ing expression for the term we call “ranking pressure”:
Pj =
1
max(a)−min(a)
∑
k
(aj − ak), (7)
where the summation is over the whole network. Now, we
define the social value of the agent i in the eyes of agent j
as xjPi, and assume that the agents take into account the
views of their neighbours in addition to their own when
evaluating their total social value Vi. Thus, we write
Vi = xiPi +
∑
k∈m1(i)
xkPi, (8)
where m1(i) denotes agents that are one step away from
agent i. The first term on the right could be considered
as the agent’s “self esteem” and the second the “social
value” given to it by its first neighbours. It should be
noted at this point that in defining Vi in terms of Pi we
have assumed that ai does not confer direct advantages
or disadvantages for the agents. Therefore, the most nat-
ural interpretation for ai is that it represents the owner-
ship of pure status symbols or Veblen goods, i.e. goods
that are only, or mostly, desirable due to their status-
enhancing properties, such as luxury items. If ai would
give some advantages or disadvantages for the agents, Eq.
(8) would have to be revised accordingly. The agents in
our simulations attempt to gain as much social value as
possible, both in absolute and relative terms, and do this
either by changing their opinion variables or adjusting
their relations to other agents. The system we use here
is purely reactive, with agents reacting to the changes in
their social environment in accordance with BTH. The
social gain function could then be written as
∆i(t1, t0) = Vi(t1)− Vi(t0) +
∑
k
(Vi(t1)− Vk(t1))
−
∑
k
(Vi(t0)− Vk(t0)), (9)
where t0 and t1 are the two consecutive time steps.
The sign of this function determines the direction of the
changes in xi.
The decision making method employed by the agents
is thus a simple hill climbing algorithm: At a given time
step t, first an agent observes the quantity ∆i(t−1, t−2),
and then changes its variable xi(t− 1), which leads to a
recurrence relation of the form
xi(t) =
{
xi(t− 1) + dx, if Gi > 0,
xi(t− 1)− dx, otherwise (10)
where Gi = sign[(∆i(t− 1, t− 2)× (xi(t− 2)−xi(t− 1))]
and dx is a small increment. In the spirit of simulated an-
nealing techniques, the magnitude of the change is larger
at the beginning of the dynamics and falls linearly with
time to a minimum value, the maximum and minimum
values being dx = 0.11 and dx = 0.01, respectively, and
the time period to reach the minimum is 1000 time steps.
In general, the links between the agents in the social
network may change in time for which purpose we use
the following rewiring scheme of Ref. [28]. The social
network of the agents is initially random, but will change
periodically, i.e. at every g time steps of the dynamical
Eq. (10). Given the definition of the total social value of
an agent in Eq. (8), the gain function Eq.(9) can be used
to calculate the loss or gain in total social status when
forming or breaking new social bonds. In this study, we
take any positive gain as sufficient to justify the rear-
rangement of social relations between the agents. When
4agent i considers cutting an existing bond with agent j,
the gain function has the form
∆ci,j = Vj − Vi − (ki + 2)xjPi, (11)
where ki is the current number of neighbours of agent
i. Similarly, when agent i considers forming a new bond
with agent j, the social gain function reads
∆fi,j = Vi − Vj + (ki + 2)xjPi − xiPj . (12)
Since any positive change indicated by the functions
above leads to rewiring, it is the sign of these functions
that determines whether or not links between agents are
broken or created. For instance, if ∆ci,j > 0, the link be-
tween agents i and j will be cut, and preserved if ∆ci,j < 0.
In the same vein, a link between agents i and j will be cre-
ated if ∆fi,j > 0, and not created otherwise. It should be
noted that when forming links the opinions of both agents
are taken into account: The relation formation only suc-
ceeds if ∆fi,j and ∆
f
j,i are both positive. The agents will
form all the relationships they can in a rewiring cycle.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The numerical simulations of the models of social sys-
tem described in the previous sections are performed as
follows. First, the initial state of the system is set at
random with the agents given a relatively small initial
opinion xi between −1 and 1, a ranking parameter ai
between 0 and maximum value of 100.0 and initial con-
nections to other agents, with initial average degree of
5. The opinion and ranking parameters are chosen using
a random number generator, which returns a flat dis-
tribution. The dynamics are then run for 200000 time
steps, which is, according to our test runs, sufficient for
the general structure of the network to settle. However,
the dynamics of the opinion variables do not have a set
stopping point, so they may experience fluctuations even
when such fluctuations do not have an effect on the net-
work structure anymore.
To obtain reliable statistics, the same simulations are
repeated 100 times with random initial values, and av-
erages are calculated from these repeated tests for the
quantities under study. The rewiring timescale g is fixed
to 100 in our simulations, since this value lies in the range
where communities are formed in the opinion formation
model of Ref. [28]. The main parameter whose effect is
studied here is the number of simulated agents, N .
The main objective of this research is to study the
structure of the social networks created under BTH as-
sumption in the case of a rigid ranking system, which we
perform using the model explained in Section III. The
most interesting properties of the system are then asso-
ciated with assortativity, or the tendency of agents with
high degrees connecting to other highly connected agents,
and homophily, or the inclination of similar agents form-
ing connections between each other. In the context of
this study, homophily refers to agents with similar rank-
ing parameters forming connections with each other.
The averaged numerical results extracted from the sim-
ulations consist then of the standard network properties,
i.e. degree 〈k〉 the shortest path 〈L〉, the average clus-
tering coefficient 〈C〉, the mean number of second neigh-
bours 〈n(2)〉, susceptibility 〈s〉 and average assortativity
coefficient 〈ra〉, and a homophily coefficient 〈rh〉. Sus-
ceptibility here refers to average cluster size, which is
calculated as the second moment of the number of s sized
clusters, ns:
〈s〉 =
∑
s nss
2∑
s nss
. (13)
As customary in percolation theory, the largest connected
component of the network is not counted in calculating
s. For the assortativity coefficient we use the definition
given in [29], and the homophily coefficient is defined
using Pearson’s product moment coefficient, which mea-
sures the goodness of a linear fit to a given data. For a
sample it can be defined as
rh =
∑M
i (vi − v)(wi − w)√∑M
i (vi − v)2
√∑M
i (wi − w)2
, (14)
where v and w are vectors containing the value param-
eters of agents linked by link i, v and w are the mean
values of these vectors, respectively, and M is the total
number of links. More specifically, if agents α and β are
connected by link i, then vi = aα and wi = aβ . The links
are indexed as follows: the links involving the first agent
are given the first indices, then follow the links involving
the second agent but not the first, and so on, without re-
peating links that have already been indexed. It should
be noted, however, that rh only measures linear correla-
tion between the ranking parameters of linked agents, it
does not indicate how steep these trends are. To check
whether the system is truly homophilic, then, one needs
to make a linear fit to the data: the closer the obtained
linear coefficients are to 1, the greater the homophily.
The average network properties of the system, with
graphs illustrating the behaviour of the system are shown
in Fig. 1 as functions of the population size, which is
varied between 50 and 500. The main observations that
can be made about the graphs in Fig.1(a) are that at
lower population levels they show a tendency of breaking
apart into many subcomponents of different sizes, while
for larger population sizes they tend to consist of a sin-
gle large component and possibly some smaller separate
clusters. A noteworthy fact about these clusters is that
they consist of agents with similar values of the rank-
ing pressure Pi, which means that the network exhibits
homophily in this case. The largest clusters are found
at extreme values, and they become smaller when one
approaches 0, which also corresponds to average ranking
parameters.
In the high population case the picture becomes more
complicated due to the emergence of clusters that con-
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FIG. 1: (a) Graphs showing examples of the network structure
for three different sizes, N , where the colour represents the
value of the agent’s normalized ranking pressure, Pi/Pmax.
Observe communities of tightly bound agents of the same
colour. The circular vertices represent agents whose opin-
ion variable xi and ranking pressure Pi have the same sign,
while the triangular vertices represent agents having oppo-
site signs. (b) Network properties, such as degree 〈k〉, the
shortest path 〈L〉, the average clustering coefficient 〈C〉, the
mean number of second neighbours 〈n(2)〉, susceptibility 〈s〉,
assortativity coefficient 〈ra〉, and homophily coefficient 〈rh〉
as averages over 100 realizations for the model as a function
of the population size, ranging from 50 to 500.
tain agents with opposing opinions as well. These new
clusters tend to be less connected than the previously de-
scribed homogeneous ones, and they tend to connect to
the large subgraphs, thus forming a single giant graph. A
closer look reveals that these agents generally have opin-
ion variables and ranking pressures with opposite signs
and are depicted as triangles in Fig. 1 and named ‘con-
trarians” from now on.
A naive analysis would indicate that the agents with
positive ranking pressures should always support the as-
cending hierarchy, and the agents with negative rank-
ing pressures should always support the descending hier-
archy. However, the contrarian agents exhibit opposite
preferences. The reason why this behaviour is status-wise
profitable can be found by looking into the connections of
the contrarian agents, details of which are shown in Figs.
2 and 3. As it turns out, most of the connections they
form are to other similar agents but with opposite “po-
larity” to theirs, i.e. the contrarian agent with negative
ranking pressure forms connections mostly with contrar-
ian agents of positive ranking pressure, and vice versa.
An important quantity in the model is the social value
Vi, which is a product of the opinion and ranking pres-
sure, as it is seen in Eq. 8. If xi and Pi have opposite
signs then the “self esteem” part of Vi is negative, which
in itself does not mean that the agent cannot develop a
contrarian opinion, since the second sum in the equation
could be positive because it depends on the opinions of
the neighbours j. This allows the contrarian to be able
to make connections with agents of the same or opposite
ranking pressure. Additionally, by looking at all connec-
tions among contrarians we find that they mostly have
Pi of the same sign as xj , as illustrated in the example
of Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2: Scatterplot for ranking pressure Pi of agent i vs. the
opinion variable xj of agent j, taken from 10 realisations for
networks with N = 250 agents. Observe that in most cases
xj and Pi have the same sign (especially for normal-normal
and contrarian-contrarian links), while only in case of normal
- contrarian links they can have opposite signs.
This situation can be status-wise beneficial to all par-
ties involved, since the small penalty to an agent’s self-
esteem is more than compensated by the respect that the
agent will gain in this case from other agents. The fact
that the agents could find this strategy using as primi-
tive an intelligence setup as hill climbing is astounding.
Another interesting thing about the contrarians is that
they appear mostly as connections between clusters that
are defined as communities of “normal” agents.
The various kinds of behaviour exhibited by the social
networks have a marked effect on the network properties
also shown in Fig. 1(b). The most obvious is the gradu-
ally rising normalised maximum cluster size (〈cmax〉/N),
which is about 40% of total population size for N = 50,
and over 95% for N = 500. From the figure it seems
that the maximum cluster size reaches 50% of the popu-
lation size for approximately N = 180, after which point
we may assume that the contrarian behavioural patterns
start to become progressively more pronounced.
The susceptibility (〈s〉) at first rises pretty much lin-
early, which is not too surprising because of the tendency
of network to break into smaller subgraphs at low pop-
ulation sizes. However, once the population size reaches
about 200, the susceptibility starts to decay, most likely
due to the main component of the network becoming
6more prominent, with a decay pattern that is almost
piecewise linear itself, apart from fairly large fluctuations.
While fairly high throughout, the homophily (〈rh〉)
and clustering coefficients (〈C〉) gradually fall as func-
tions of population size, almost certainly due to the pro-
liferation of contrarians. There are no great changes in
other network properties, as in the average assortativity
coefficient (〈ra〉), although some faint systematic tenden-
cies can be discerned, a slight rising of the average path
length (〈L〉), as well as slightly decreasing average num-
ber of clusters (〈nc〉). The rest of the properties per agent
are nearly constant, a slight rise of the average number
number of second neighbours (〈n(2)〉/N), and a just per-
ceptible decrease of the average cluster size (〈cs〉/N) and
average degree (〈k〉/N).
A way to illustrate the homophily of the system is to
make a scatterplot of the ranking parameters of linked
agents. As it is seen in Fig.3, the correlation turns out to
be very homophilous, as the ranking parameters of linked
agents correspond very closely to one other. The emer-
gence of the contrarians is also clearly seen: for N = 50,
the percentage of contrarians in 10 realisations is 5.4%,
while for N = 250 is 13.8%, for N = 500 is 24.9% and for
one realisation in in a network of 1000 agents is 38.5%.
There is also a clear decreasing linear trend due to the
contrarians.
The rising trend is without doubt caused by the normal
agents, who tend to associate with agents of similar rank,
and the decreasing trend is likewise due to the contrari-
ans. Both trends have a similar tendency to form square-
like patterns along the diagonals, with each “square” cor-
responding to some of the many visible communities of
the graphs.
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FIG. 3: A scatterplot of the ranking parameters ai vs. aj of
linked agents i and j for one realisation of networks of differ-
ent sizes. The colour code: dark blue for connections between
normal agents with positive ranking pressure and opinion vari-
ables, light blue for connections between normal agents with
negative ranking pressure and opinion variables, dark green
for connections between contrarian agents of different ”polar-
ity”, light green for connections between contrarian agents of
same ”polarity” (these are almost non-existent), light red for
connections between normal and contrarian agents with differ-
ent signs of the opinion variable, and dark red for connections
between normal and contrarian agents with same signs of the
opinion variable.
As explained above, it is necessary to check whether
the correspondence of the rankings is truly homophilic.
In Table I we show the value of the homophily coefficient
of normal and contrarian agents for networks of various
sizes. The data were taken from 10 different numerical
realisations in each case. Observe that normal agents
have values very near one, and contrarians are around
one half. Also in the table we show the slope of the re-
gression of ai vs. aj . Normal agents are very close to one,
indicating high degree of homophily, and the contrarians
are negative and around 0.6, indicating that they mostly
form connection with agents that have opposite signs of
the ranking pressure, and are much less homophilic.
Normals Contrarians
N=50 N=250 N=500 N=50 N=250 N=500
Slope 0.955 0.968 0.963 -0.606 -0.607 -0.707
rh 0.959 0.963 0.959 -0.588 -0.636 -0.731
TABLE I: Homophily measurement from 10 numerical reali-
sations of networks with different sizes.
In Fig. 4 we show the degree and the final state of the
opinion variable as functions of the ranking parameter of
the agents. One can see that the agents with relatively
large or low values for the ranking parameter seem to
have more neighbours than the agents with the ranking
parameters close to the average rank. The communities
are also visible in this figure in the form of plateaus at
progressively more extreme values of the ranking param-
eter. The appearance of contrarians is also very clearly
visibly in this figure.
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FIG. 4: The degree ki and the final state of the opinion
variable xi/xmax as a function of the ranking parameter ai
of agent i . The colour code is as follows: light blue for
normal agents with positive ranking pressure, light red for
normal agents with negative ranking pressure, dark blue for
contrarian agents with positive ranking pressure, and dark
red for contrarian agents with negative ranking pressure.
The lower row of panels in Fig.4 shows the correla-
tion of agents’ ranking parameters and opinion variables.
As expected, most of the agents below the average rank-
ing parameters have negative opinion variables, and sim-
7ilarly, the agents with the above average ranking param-
eters have positive opinion variables, at least for small
N . There are some exceptions to this rule. The contrar-
ian agents are seen clearly in the figure as agents whose
opinion variables have opposing signs to agents of similar
ranking. On the other hand, when they are present, there
are often such normal agents that have more egalitarian
views, i.e. less extreme opinions.
There is a clear tendency for the agents to attain the
most extreme values for opinion variables in either case,
although this tendency is smaller as the size of the net-
work increases. A clear visualisation of this phenomenon
is depicted in Fig. 5 where one can see that the cumula-
tive relative frequency of values of x is almost vertical at
the extremes for normal agents. The proportion of nor-
mal agents with |x| > 980 is 51.6, 47.4, 39.5 and 34.3%,
for N = 50, 250, 500 and 1000, respectively. The picture
is very different for contrarians, their distribution tends
to be uniform independent of the network size, except at
the extreme values where the percentage of agents with
|x| > 980 is 4.8, 10.4, 11.6 and 6.4%, for N = 50, 250,
500 and 1000, respectively.
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FIG. 5: Empirical distributions of opinions for 10 realisations
on networks of sizes 50, 250, and 500 and for single realisation
for the system size of 1000 agents, where blue and orange
symbols stand for normal and contrarian agents, respectively.
As simulations with over 500 agents are very time-
consuming, we have not tried to obtain results with large
statistics for these cases. We did, however, run some sin-
gular simulations with very high agent numbers, to see
whether the patterns observed above would hold even
there. Fig. 6 shows the resultant graph, rank-rank, and
rank-degree correlation scatterplots for a simulation with
1000 agents. As we can see, the contrarians have become
more numerous and have ever more extreme ranking pa-
rameters, as could be expected from the earlier results.
Another interesting feature that emerges from the anal-
ysis of 10 numerical realisations is that the degree distri-
bution is bimodal for normal agents, that is, there is a
large number of agents with low or high degree and very
few around the mean degree value. The range of degrees
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FIG. 6: The rank-rank (a) and rank-degree correlations (b)
for a single simulation with N = 1000 agents, along with the
final configuration of the network (c); the colour codes and
symbols are the same as in Figs 1 (c), 3 (a), and 4 (b).
and the median of the distribution increase with the size
of the network.
For contrarians the picture is different. their degree
distribution is unimodal (although not normal) and their
median is smaller. Furthermore, their degree range is
about half the one for normal agents. This is clearly seen
in Fig. 7, were we plot the relative frequency as a function
of the degree (k). Observe that the proportion of isolated
agents (k = 0) is larger for the contrarians although this
tendency diminishes as the networks become larger.
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FIG. 7: Histogram showing the degree distribution of agents
for 10 realisations on networks of sizes 50, 250, and 500 and
for single realisation for the system size of 1000 agents.
8V. APPROXIMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to better understand the behaviour of the
model we need to perform a thorough analysis of its me-
chanics. A convenient starting point for this effort is
studying the tendency of the agents with extreme rank-
ing parameters to form large fully connected communi-
ties, while the agents of more average rank form small
fully connected communities. Just from considering the
nature of the BTH one might formulate the hypothesis
that this may be because of agents with average rankings
not forming links with agents with extreme rankings due
to it not being status-wise beneficial. If an agent sees
that the other agent would gain more in having a link
between them, that link will probably not be created by
the agent. By inspecting the rewiring rules Eqs.(11) and
(12) this hypothesis can be verified. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can limit our investigation to the case of two
agents with positive ranking pressures and opinion vari-
ables considering forming a link, as the case with agents
with negative ranking pressures and opinion variables fol-
lows from a similar line of reasoning. From Eq. (12) one
finds that if agent i considers forming a link with agent
j, the ranking pressures and the opinion variables of the
agents and their neighbours must satisfy the condition
Pi
Pj
>
xj +
∑
k∈m1(j) xk + xi
(ki + 2)xj + xi +
∑
k∈m1(i) xk
(15)
for the potential link to be acceptable to agent i. If we
assume, for simplicity, that the opinion variables of the
agents and their neighbours have about the same value,
then condition (15) simplifies to
Pi
Pj
>
1
2
kj + 1
ki + 3/2
, (16)
which in turn simplifies to
Pi
Pj
>
1
2
, (17)
if we further assume that ki, kj  1 and ki ≈ kj , which
is reasonable considering that most of the agents at least
have large number of neighbours and tend to belong to
almost fully connected communities. Here the implicit
assumption is that the agents i and j would belong to
the same block, if they formed a link. Written in terms
of ranking parameters (17) becomes
ai >
1
2
(aj + 〈a〉) , (18)
where 〈a〉 = N−1∑k ak is the average of the rank-
ing parameters. From (18) it directly follows that if
agent j has the maximum allowed ranking parameter,
aj = amax, the link between the agents i and j will
only be formed if ai > 0.75amax, since 〈a〉 ≈ 0.5amax.
Similarly, if aj = 0.75amax, the two agents will only
bond if ai > 0.625amax, and if aj = 0.625amax, only
if ai > 0.5625amax, and with every iteration the range of
possible ranking parameters of agent i shrinks. This pat-
tern is remarkably apparent in the rank-rank correlation
Figs. 3 and 6, in which the emergence of the contrarians
becomes increasingly clear as the population numbers are
increased. For aj = 0.5amax we find that ai must also
be 0.5amax for a link to be formed, which explains the
tendency of the agents with average ranking parameters
to have so few neighbours, as is seen in Figs.3 and 6.
To understand the emergence of the contrarians one
must analyze the dynamics of the opinion variables, en-
capsulated in Eqs.(9) and (10). Naively thinking, one
would expect agents to always choose the orientation of
their opinion parameters according to their ranking pres-
sures. This means that agents with positive ranking pres-
sures would prefer positive opinion variables, and simi-
larly agents with negative ranking pressures would pre-
fer negative opinion variables. The first hypothesis as to
how some agents would choose to go against these logi-
cal positions is related to the competitive nature of the
model’s social interactions. It may be that some agents
cannot compete in this setting and, therefore, choose to
use contrarian strategies instead.
Let us approach this question the same way as above,
focusing on an agent with positive ranking pressure and
initially positive opinion variable, connected to other sim-
ilar agents in the way revealed in Section IV. Let us as-
sume that, initially, all the agents with positive ranking
pressure increase their opinion variables and, conversely,
that all the agents with negative ranking pressure de-
crease their opinion variables in a simulation step. In
this case the social gain function of agent i is
∆i(t1, t0) = dx(N + 1)(ki + 1)Pi − dx
∑
j∈P+
(kj + 1)Pj
+dx
∑
j∈P−
(kj + 1)Pj , (19)
where P+ is the set of agents with positive ranking pres-
sure and P− the set of agents with negative ranking pres-
sure. Now,∆i(t1, t0) needs to be positive if agent i is to
continue raising its opinion variable. This yields a con-
dition of the form
(ki+1)Pi >
1
N + 1
∑
j∈P+
(kj + 1)Pj −
∑
j∈P−
(kj + 1)Pj
 .
(20)
If we denote the number of agents in P+ and P− with
N+ and N−, respectively, we can write this formula in
terms of averages over P+ and P− as follows:
(ki+1)Pi >
1
N + 1
(
N+〈(k + 1)P 〉+ −N−〈(k + 1)P 〉−) ,
(21)
where 〈〉+ denotes average over P+, and, likewise, 〈〉−
denotes average over P−. If we assume N  1 and that
9the situation is symmetric, i.e.
N+〈(k + 1)P 〉+ ≈ −N−〈(k + 1)P 〉−, (22)
which further simplifies to
(ki + 1)Pi > 〈(k + 1)P 〉+, (23)
since N = N+ +N− and N+ ≈ N−.
Condition (23) basically states that revising opinion
parameter upwards, which is the “natural” direction for
an agent in P+, is only status-wise beneficial for the agent
if the product of the agent’s degree (plus one) and the
ranking pressure are above the average of the same prod-
uct over the whole group P+. We can see from this that
the agents with low ranking pressures and the amounts
of connections fare badly under the condition (23). As
observed earlier, in the simulations the agents with av-
erage ranking parameters, who correspondingly have low
ranking pressures, are also the ones with least connec-
tions, which accordingly means that they are most likely
to become contrarians, at least with regard to (23).
But what about the observed phenomenon of more and
more of agents with higher and higher ranking parame-
ters (and thus ranking pressures) to become contrarians
as the total numbers of simulated agents increases?. The
answer to this question can be found by substituting the
numbers obtained for the sizes of the different communi-
ties to the right hand side of inequality (23), along with
the average ranking parameters for these communities,
as shown in Table II.
n Mn 〈a〉n
1 0.25N 0.875amax
2 0.125N 0.6875amax
3 0.0625N 0.59375amax
4 0.03125N 0.546875amax
TABLE II: The approximate number of members and the
average ranking parameters of the 4 largest communities in
P+.
From condition(18) it follows that the largest commu-
nity in P+ comprises of those agents with ranking param-
eters over 0.75amax, which means that the community
will have approximately 0.25N members, when one takes
into account the fact that the ranking parameters are
uniformly distributed. The second largest community,
likewise, consists of those agents with ranking param-
eters between 0.625amax and 0.75amax, and has about
0.125N members. The nth (n > 1) largest group will
have ranking parameters between amax(1 −
∑n+1
i=2 2
−i)
and amax(1 −
∑i+2
i=2 2
−n), and have 2−(n+1)N members.
While ranking parameters naturally vary from agent to
agent within the communities, the average value of the
ranking parameters of each group 〈a〉n falls approxi-
mately to the middle point of each ranking range due
to the uniform distribution of the parameters:
〈a〉n = amax
(
1− (
n+1∑
i=2
2−i + 2−(n+1))
)
. (24)
From Figs. 3 and 6 we see that only a maximum of
four to five of these communities exist in practice at any
one time, so we limit our approximation to these groups.
By assuming the groups to be fully connected, as they
seem to be in the graphs, and approximating sums of the
products of the degrees and ranking parameters with the
products of their average values we get
〈(k + 1)P 〉+ ≈ 2
4∑
n=1
M2n
(
〈a〉n − amax
2
)
, (25)
where 〈〉n denotes the average ranking parameter and
Mn the number of members of the nth largest group.
Substituting the values given in Table II we get
〈(k + 1)P 〉+ ≈ 0.05N2amax, (26)
which in turn can be inserted into (23):
(ki + 1)Pi > 0.05N
2amax. (27)
Finally, using the definition of Pi the condition (27) can
be written in the form
αi >
1
2
+ 0.05
N
ki + 1
, (28)
where αi = ai/amax.
From condition (28) we can see that the probability
of agent i following the conventional wisdom diminishes
with rising N and decreasing ki, which is what we saw
happening in our simulations judging from the results
shown in the previous Section. To take an example, for
the N = 500 case the largest community of agents with
positive ranking pressures comprises of about 125 agents.
This means, according to the inequality (28), that the
agents with αi > 0.7 could definitively be expected to
always choose to have positive opinion variables.
From Fig. 3 we can tell that the real threshold is closer
to αi > 0.8, which is, however, in remarkably good agree-
ment with the approximate value of 0.7 when one takes
into the consideration the fact that the appearance of
the contrarians themselves was not taken into account in
the derivation of (28), and that for N = 500 they are al-
ready very prominent. If one were to derive the condition
equivalent to (28) with contrarian strategies taken into
account, one would need to consider the effect that the
contrarians have on their neighbours’ total social value
V . Thus, condition (28) will most likely not hold for
networks with larger N .
The last question we need to address as regards to
the contrarians is the fact that they are often embed-
ded in the groups of normal agents. So why would it be
status-wise beneficial for an agent using normal strategy
to retain, let alone form, a link with a contrarian agent?
Let us consider a situation where an agent pursues con-
trarian strategies in a group of normal agents. Returning
to inequality (15), we see that it is acceptable for a nor-
mal agent i with Pi > 0 and maximal xi = xmax to form
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a link with a contrarian agent j with Pj > 0 and minimal
xj = −xmax if
Pi
Pj
> −kj (29)
and we assume that all the neighbours of agents i and j
also have the maximal opinion parameters. The striking
fact about this relation is that it is always fulfilled in this
case, meaning that i would always find formation of links
with contrarians acceptable. From the point of view of
agent j, however, linking to i is only acceptable if
Pj
Pi
>
1
2
ki
kj + 1/2
, (30)
which leads to the very same result as before. i.e. j
will not form a link with i unless Pj > Pi/2, if i and j
are to belong to the same group. Thus the contrarian
agents would behave and be treated as normal agents
when forming relations, which is surprising considering
that their contribution to the total social value of other
agents is negative. The latter fact is demonstrated in the
simulations with some of the most counterintuitive be-
haviours of the model, namely, relations between agents
being first broken and immediately reinstated. Let us
use Eq. (11) to determine, whether the agent i from the
previous calculations would benefit from cutting the link
with agent j, even when expression (29) says that i would
also form a link with j in the event that such a link did
not exist. With the previously stated assumptions, we
arrive to the following condition
Pj
Pi
> − 1
kj − 1 (31)
for the link to be cut. From (31) we see that unless
kj = 0, agent i will cut its ties with the contrarians.
Since kj  1 for the largest groups, the inequality (31)
is likely to be true most of the time, leading to links be-
tween agents i and j being cut and immediately reformed
repeatedly, since inequality (29) also holds. As suggested
above, we have observed this behavioural pattern in our
simulations, and to some extent it can be observed in
Fig. 2, in which it is seen that only the connections be-
tween contrarian and normal agents i and j can the signs
of xi and Pj being of opposite signs. It should again be
stressed, however, that the calculations above do not take
into account the existence of more than one contrarian.
Having more contrarians in the system allows them to
form links between each other, which has a sizeable ef-
fect on the overall structure of the network.
In summary, it could be said that while conditions (17)
and (30) provide surprisingly well fitting approximations
as to how a given agent chooses to link with other agents,
the conditions (28), (29) and (31) (though pointing to the
right direction) only give vague qualitative explanations
for the behaviour of contrarians and can not be expected
to yield precise numerical predictions.
VI. DISCUSSION
The interpretation of the ranking parameter ai serves
as the key to find possible parallels between our model
and the real world. As it describes a single property of
an agent, the links between the agents only correspond to
exchanges of opinion on whether the agents with larger
ai are “better” than the agents with smaller ai, or vice
versa.
Agents could be considered as being embedded a larger
social context, and in this context they could, in prin-
ciple, have other social connections. In this case, the
results presented in the previous Section are best in-
terpreted in terms of echo chambers, which means that
agents prefer such a social hierarchy in which they have
better relative rank, and seek to communicate their opin-
ion to others. The agents whose ranking parameters are
further away from the average, are more vocal in broad-
casting their views and gather supporters, since they rank
highly in their chosen hierarchy and, therefore, would
benefit from their hierarchy becoming more widely ac-
cepted.
On the other, the agents with average ranking param-
eters are much more reluctant to take part in the conver-
sation at all, since they do not rank highly in either of the
hierarchies. Then the end result for small system sizes is
that agents divide themselves according to their ranking
pressure into two or more distinct communities support-
ing opposing hierarchies, in which the agents with similar
rankings lump together and refuse to communicate with
those that disagree. It is the shutting out of the opposing
point of view that makes this system’s behaviour remi-
niscent of echo chambers found in reality. However, with
increasing system size the agents develop more nuanced
positions on their preferred hierarchies due to mounting
social competition, as is seen in the emergence of the
contrarians.
There is, however, an alternative way to interpret the
ranking parameter. It could be taken to represent an ag-
gregate of all the social properties of an agent, thereby
representing its total standing in the societal status mea-
sures. In this case the connections could represent the
totality of the agents’ social interactions, and the opin-
ion variables the agents’ attitude to the (current) state
society at large. With this interpretation the rupture be-
tween the different communities observed for smaller sys-
tem sizes would actually represent a real disintegration
of the society. This might have implications concerning
early human migrations, as they could easily have been
influenced by social pressures as well as material needs.
If the environmental pressures define a minimum group
size necessary for a comfortable life for a tribe, and this
minimum is smaller than the limit at which the tribe is
forced to be adopting more advanced strategies to en-
hance social stability, as exemplified by the contrarians
in our simulations, the tribe may well split, with splinter
groups migrating elsewhere.
Other than the different economic games, BTH can
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also shed some light into the well known paradox of value,
also known as diamond-water paradox, which refers to
the fact that diamonds are far more valued in monetary
terms than water, even though water is necessary for life
and diamonds not. From the BTH view point the so-
lution to this paradox is obvious: Water, being neces-
sary requirement for life, has to be available in sufficient
quantities to all living humans, which means that owning
water or its source does not set an individual apart from
others, that is, an individual cannot really compare fa-
vorably to others on grounds of having water. Diamonds,
on the other hand, are relatively rare, and thus cannot
be owned by everyone. Therefore, an individual possess-
ing diamonds is compared favourably to others, and so
diamonds acquire a relatively high value in comparison
to water in the minds of humans, in a very similar man-
ner with which the Veblen goods become valuable. Then
BTH, in a sense, contains in itself a natural definition of
value, although further work is needed to determine how
exactly this status-value relates to other forms of value,
such as value derived from usefulness or necessity.
In Section II we only analysed the behaviour of the
accepter, since this is straightforward in comparison to
predicting the behaviour of the proposer. The experi-
ments on the Ultimatum Game often find that the pro-
posers tend to offer fair shares to accepters, which is eas-
ily explained in the context of BTH by the desire of the
proposer to have the proposal accepted: the proposers
only offer shares that they would accept themselves, and
in this way Eq.(3) also restricts the proposers offers, al-
though it cannot tell the exact amount of money offered.
To be able to give a better estimate for the offers one
would need to study the learning processes that shape
the proposers experience on how uneven treatment peo-
ple are usually willing to tolerate. This is, however, out-
side the scope of this paper.
The behaviour of dictators in the dictator game [30]
is somewhat more difficult to analyse using BTH. The
dictator game is similar to the Ultimatum game, the only
difference being that the other player does not even get
to make a choice, and only receives what the first player,
or dictator, endows. It has been observed that [24] in this
game the dictators tend to be rather generous, which is
difficult but not impossible to explain in the context of
BTH, if one takes into account the effect of reputation
and other “social goods”. The nature of such influence
on the behaviour of the dictator will be studied in a later
work.
However, there are some indications that BTH could
very well be applied to the dictator game when all the
social effects are taken into account. It has been reported
[31] that when the rules of the dictator game are modified
so that instead of giving money to the other players, the
dictator gets to take some or all of the money given to
the other players (thus turning the game into a “taking
game”), the dictator’s behaviour changes from egalitar-
ian to self serving, i.e. taking often the majority or even
all of the available money. From the BTH point of view,
the dictator’s observed behaviour change can potentially
be explained in terms of social norms. In the ordinary
dictator game the dictator may still feel bound by the
usual norms of the society, while in the “taking game” it
is encouraged to go against these norms. This sets the
“taker” apart from the other player in particular, and
other members of the society in general. Hence the dic-
tator feels “better” than the others when breaking the
norms with impunity, and act on this feeling by taking
money from the other players. The fact that BTH can
possibly lead to formation of norms as well as rebellion
against these norms is well worth of further studies.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Relating to the known results of the Ultimatum game,
we have formulated a hypothesis explaining the observed
behaviour of humans in terms of superiority maximiza-
tion, or “better than”-hypothesis, and presented a sim-
ple agent-based model to implement this hypothesis. The
model describes agents with constant ranking parameters
and raises the question whether the agents with larger
ranks are “better” than agents with smaller ranks or the
other way around.
We have found that the social system produced by our
model, features homophily, meaning that agents form-
ing social ties with other agents with similar ranking pa-
rameters, and assortativity, describing the tendency of
highly/lowly connected agents forming links with other
highly/lowly connected agents. In addition we find com-
munity formation, both in terms of there being commu-
nities with opposing opinions and in terms of the commu-
nities with the same opinion fracturing into smaller ones
according to their ranking parameters. Furthermore, we
have observed the formation of a hierarchy, in the sense of
a connectivity hierarchy being formed on top of the one
defined by the ranking parameters, with the agents with
extreme ranking parameters presenting higher connectiv-
ity than the agents with average ranking parameters.
Moreover, we have found that the resulting social net-
works tend to be disconnected for small system sizes, but
mostly connected for larger system sizes. This fact may
have some relevance for research of early human migra-
tions, hinting of the effects of social pressure in shaping
the social network.
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